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Abstract 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) has always been 
outspoken about the essence of the European Community (EC) as a Rule of 
Law Community. The notion of the Rule of Law entered the texts of the 
Treaty and arguably plays a crucial role in the Community legal order, 
serving as one of the fundamentals of ‘integration through law’. Yet, the 
analysis of numerous studies of the Rule of Law in Community context 
reveals that the understanding on the Rule of Law as a Community legal 
construct, as opposed to a notion borrowed from the legal systems of the 
Member States, is not receiving enough attention. Confusion persists 
between the Rule of Law as understood in the national contexts of the 
Member States and the Community concept, which presumably should be 
governed by EC law alone. This paper aims to bridge the gap between the 
obvious importance of the Community Rule of Law in the EC legal order 
and the country-specific vision, ascribed to the Rule of Law in each Member 
State, which results in a vague and even contradictory understanding of 
Community Rule of Law in different Member States, threatening to 
undermine the effectiveness and uniform application of Community Law 
throughout the entire territory of the Community. A substantive vision of 
Community Rule of Law is offered as a possible tool to be employed to this 
effect. 
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1 Introduction and structure of the argument 
 
As with democracy, the separation of powers, human rights, and the like, the 
Rule of Law1 is a concept of overwhelming importance.2 It is ‘not only a 
safeguard, but a legal embodiment of freedom’, as Hayek explained.3 It plays 
a crucial role in the functioning of any modern democratic state.4 The EU, a 
non-state entity sui-generis, also succumbed to the charm of this obviously 
attractive concept. It is clear, however, that a concept shaped in the context 
of a nation state legal system can hardly be transposed to the European legal 
order without any alteration of its meaning.5 Given the profound differences 
that exist between the legal realities of the Community legal order and the 
legal orders of the Member States, one should always keep in mind Weiler’s 
warning of not confusing ‘oranges with apples’, initially issued in the 
context of a debate related to the transposition of the notion of democracy in 
such a way.6  
                                               
1
 This article develops and recontextualises the points made in D. Kochenov, EU 
Enlargement and the Failure of Conditionality  (The Hague: Kluwer Law Internatio- 
nal 2008) at 98. 
2
 Literature on the Rule of Law is abundant. See for example B.Z. Tamanaha, On the 
Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
2004); T.J. Zywicki, ‘The Rule of Law, Freedom, and Prosperity’, (2003) 10 
Supreme Court Economic Review 1; P. Costa and D. Zolo (eds.) Lo Stato di diritto: 
Storia, teoria, critica (Milano: Feltrinelli 2002); M. Rosenfeld ‘The Rule of Law 
and the Legitimacy of Constitutional Democracy’ (2001) 74 Southern California 
Law Review 1307; P. Popelier, Rechtszekerheid als beginsel voor behoorlijke 
regelgeving (Antwerpen/Groningen: Intersentia Rechtswetenschappen 1997) at 35 
(providing a good summary of literature); R.H. Fallon Jr., ‘“The Rule of Law” as a 
Concept in Constitutional Discourse’ (1997) 97 Columbian Law Review 1; M.J. 
Radin, ‘Reconsidering the Rule of Law’ (1989) 69 Boston.University Law Review 
781; J.W.M. Engels and others (eds.) De rechsstaat herdacht (Zwolle: W.E.J. 
Tjeenk Willink 1989); W. Leisner,  ‘L’État de droit – une contradiction?’ in M. 
Waline (ed.) Receuil d’études en homage à Charles Eisenmann (Paris: Cujas 1977); 
N.S. Marsh, ‘The Rule of Law as a Supra-National Concept’ in A.G. Guest (ed.) 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1961); A.L. 
Goodhart, ‘The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty’ (1958) 106 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 7. 
3
 F.A. von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1994 (1944)) at 90. 
4
 On the relationship between the Rule of Law and democracy, see for example 
Kochenov above n. 1 at 110. 
5
 Kochenov, ‘Behind the Copenhagen Façade. The Meaning and Structure of the 
Copenhagen Political Criterion of Democracy and the Rule of Law’ (2004) 8 
European Integration online Papers at 10. 
6
 J.H.H. Weiler, The Constitution for Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1999) at 268. 
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This article will make a number of observations on the nature of the 
EU Rule of Law, advocating strict separation between the Rule of Law as 
applied in the national legal context of the Member States and the Rule of 
Law to be employed within the system of Community law. It should be up to 
the EU law alone to define the essence of EU Rule of Law, and the filling of 
the concept should not change from Member State to Member State, 
following the change of legal system and the change of language. Indeed, a 
linguistic aspect plays a prominent role here, promoting confusion: charged 
with multiple national-legal connotations, the notions corresponding to the 
English ‘Rule of Law’ in the other 22 Community languages can clearly 
harm the unity of the EU Rule of Law. 
Observations on the desired nature of the EU Rule of Law will 
require making important choices between the varying understandings of the 
Rule of Law apparent in the nation-state context before these can be applied 
at the Community and the Union level. The most important role here is to be 
played by the analysis of the doctrinal divide existing between the formal 
and the substantive approaches to the nature of the Rule of Law as 
understood in legal theory and accommodating the EU Rule of Law within 
this divide. 
The article will proceed as follows: Firstly, as a starting point of the 
analysis a brief summary of doctrinal thinking on the Rule of Law will be 
provided, outlining both the importance and the potential vagueness of the 
notion, as well as the doctrinal differences existing between a number of 
conflicting approaches to the nature of the Rule of Law. To make a concise 
argument, the analysis contained in the article mostly builds on the Anglo-
American approach to the concept, which suffices to introduce the reader to 
the complexity of the Rule of Law and to provide a background for the 
debate related to the possible problems connected with the formulation and 
the practical use of the EU Rule of Law. Needless to say, such an approach 
should not be taken as a denial of the added value of the corresponding 
continental concepts (2). Secondly, the present practice of using the notion 
of the Rule of Law in the Community (and, eventually, the Union) legal 
context will be discussed, outlining the legal roots of the concept in the 
Community legal order as well as the limitations of the dominant use of the 
concept (3). Thirdly, the essential traits of the Community Rule of Law-to-be 
will be suggested, building on the clashes between the analysis contained in 
the first and second parts of the article and suggesting a change in the use of 
the concept at the Community level (4). The paper concludes by arguing for 
a substantive concept of EU Rule of Law to be defined by EU Law itself (5).  
 
 
2 Essential aspects of the concept 
 
The Rule of Law is both popular and vague. While every lawyer has a more 
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or less articulated idea regarding its meaning, these ideas are often in clear 
contradiction to each other. Consequently, any recourse to the Rule of Law 
begs for an explanation, clarifying what exactly is meant by the concept. 
 
2.1 Popularity v. the lack of clarity 
 
The Rule of Law is recognised by international legal instruments and is used 
by lawyers and policy-makers alike.7 The ‘export of the Rule of Law’8 
became a prominent topic in the rhetoric of States and international 
organisations engaged in dealing with countries in transition and in the 
countries of the developing world.9 The same also applies to the European 
Union, engaged in the promotion of the Rule of Law both in the context of 
its enlargements10 and as part of its neighbourhood policy.11 The concept is 
thus widely regarded as an absolutely necessary element destined to play a 
prominent role in any modern democratic legal system. Consequently, any 
legal system engaged in the export of the Rule of Law presumably allows 
this concept to play a prominent role internally as well. As a result of this, 
the Rule of Law is to be found virtually everywhere. This is not the self-
image of the countries of the ‘first world’ only. On the contrary, just as with 
democracy, almost every regime in the world is more likely than not to 
presume its Rule of Law nature. It does not mean that all or the majority of 
jurisdictions in the world adhere to the ideals of the Rule of Law. The value 
of such a conclusion would obviously be marginal, since the omnipresence 
of the Rule of Law first of all suggests that the concept is sufficiently vague 
to be easily found in any legal system, which does not only play against its 
claimed importance but also allows questioning its essential components. It 
has even been claimed that ‘il successo del termine [Rule of Law] sia dato 
                                               
7
 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA res. 217 A (III) 10 Dec. 1948, 
U.N. Doc. A/810, Preamble, § 3; European Convention on Human Rights 4 Nov. 
1950, ETS 005, Preamble, § 6. 
8
 On this process, see for example J.C. Reitz, ‘Export of the Rule of Law’ (2003) 13 
Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 429. 
9
 See T. Carothers, ‘Promoting the Rule of Law Abroad: The Problem of 
Knowledge’ Rule of Law series Working paper No. 34 (Washington D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace WP 2003); M. Stephenson, Rule of Law as a 
Goal of Development Policy, available at <http://www.worldbank.org>; J.M. Ngugi,  
‘Policing Neo-Liberal Reforms: The Rule of Law as an enabling and Restrictive 
Discourse’ (2005) 26 University of Pennsylvania International Economic Law 513. 
10
 See Kochenov, above n. 1. 
11
 For critique, see A. Magen, ‘The Shadow of Enlargement: Can the European 
Neighbourhood Policy Achieve Compliance?’ 12 Columbia Journal of European 
Law 384. 
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dalla sua vaghezza’.12 
 It becomes clear that notwithstanding the abundant references to the 
‘Rule of Law’, the meaning of it is probably much less articulated than one 
might presuppose at first glance. Popularity and functionality of legal 
concepts do not go hand in hand. To agree with Bröstl, ‘pure fashion or 
playing with words can hardly introduce real changes into the life of a State 
or a society’.13 Those who find the concept important also point out that its 
meaning is far from clear.14 Not only is the Rule of Law associated with 
different possible types of relationships between State and law and between 
law and moral but it is also rooted in different European legal traditions, 
making the scope of this notion, which is quite vague in any case, also 
dependent on the legal tradition in which the concept is used. Consequently, 
the scope of the Rule of Law, État de droit, Rechtsstaat, Estado de derecho, 
Stato di diritto, and so on, is highly diverse.15 
The presence of this concept in EC law does not ease the tension 
between all its possible meanings. The European understanding of the Rule 
of Law is only at the stage of articulation. While a number of elements of it 
are quite clear, the general scope of the European Rule of Law is yet to be 
outlined.  
 
2.2 Most often outlined components of the concept 
 
At the core of the Rule of Law is the idea that any exercise of power should 
be subject to the law:16 the Rule of Law, not men.17 The concept does not 
                                               
12
 F. Biondo, ‘Stato di diritto o stato di giustizia? Osservazioni critiche su 
un’alternativa troppo rigida’ (2004) 4 Diritto & questioni pubbliche 7 at 7 [most 
likely, the term ‘Rule of Law’ is successful due to its vagueness].  
13
 A. Bröstl, ‘Challenges to the Rechtsstaat-Model in Slovakia’ (1997) 17 
Rechtstheorie 315. 
14
 Carothers, above n. 9 at 8; Rosenfeld, above n. 2 at 1308; R. Grote ‘Rule of Law, 
Rechtsstaat and État de droit’ in C. Starck (ed.) Constitutionalism, Universalism and 
Democracy – A Comparative Analysis (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-gesellschaft 
1999) at 271; Fallon, above n. 2 at 1; Radin above nr. 2 at 781; M. Scheltema, ‘De 
Rechtsstaat’, in J.W.M. Engels and others (eds.) De rechtsstaat herdacht (Zwolle: 
W.E.J. Tjeenk Willink 1989) at 11. 
15
 For an extensive overview of the differences and similarities in question, see 
Grote, above at n. 14. 
16
 See K. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 1971) (advocating the idea that any power, even that acquired 
democratically should be checked: the Rule of Law can limit democracy). 
17
 U.S. Supreme Court, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803), where the 
government of laws is famously opposed to the government of men. The wording 
seems to originate in James Harrington’s utopia Oceania, published in 1653. On the 
history of development of the concept of the Rule of Law see for example  F. 
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leave room for any absolute arbitrary power.18 Such an idea of government 
goes back to Locke19 and the framers of the US Constitution20 and was 
clarified at the end of the nineteenth century by A.V. Dicey in his seminal 
work ‘Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution’.21 
 
Dicey outlined three main elements of the Rule of Law. The first is  
 
absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the influence of 
arbitrary power, [which] excludes the existence of arbitrariness, of prerogative, or 
even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the government.22  
 
The second is  
 
equality before the law, or the equal subjection of all classes to the ordinary law of 
the land administered by the ordinary Law Courts.23  
 
Lastly, Dicey submitted that  
 
with us under the law of the constitution, the rules which in foreign countries 
naturally form part of a constitutional code, are not the source but the consequence 
of the rights of individuals, as defined and enforced by the courts.24  
 
Although rooted in the English legal system of the time, Dicey’s account 
captures the nature of the Rule of Law in general and remains one of the 
most influential to date. 
                                                                                                              
Dallmayr, ‘Hermeneutics of the Rule of Law’ (1990) 11 Cardozo Law Review  
1449. 
18
 Prohibiting the ultimate authority within a given system from being human and 
leaving it to the law. On the law as ultimate authority, see for example H.L.A. Hart,  
The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1961); H. Kelsen General Theory of 
Law and State ( Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1945). 
19
 J. Locke, Two Treatises of Government (1698), (I. Shapiro (ed.)) (New 
Haven/London: Yale University Press 2003) Second Treatise, § 137, 160 et seq. 
20
 As well as earlier constitutional documents. See for example  Art. XXX of the Bill 
of Rights of the Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780: ‘In the government of this 
commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and 
judicial powers, or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative 
and judicial powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative 
and executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws 
and not of men (emphasis added).’ 
21
 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (London/New 
York: Macmillan and Co. 1907, 7th ed.). 
22
 Id at  198. 
23
 Id. 
24
 Id. at 199. 
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Most generally conceived, the Rule of Law requires, in accordance 
with Rosenfeld,  
 
that the State only subject the citizenry to publicly promulgated laws, that the State’s 
legislative function be separate from the adjudicative function, and that no one 
within the polity be above the law.25  
 
Given the general character of such definitions, more detailed outlines of the 
meaning of the Rule of Law are clearly needed in order to grasp the meaning 
of the concept. One of the successful attempts to formulate the essence of the 
Rule of Law is that of Fallon.26 Summarising the existing literature, Fallon 
formulated a five-element structure constituting the Rule of Law: 27 
 
1. ‘The capacity of legal rules, standards or principles to guide people in the 
conduct of their affairs’. 
2. ‘Efficacy. The law should actually guide people’. 
3. ‘Stability. The law should be reasonably stable, in order to facilitate planning 
and co-ordinated action over time’. 
4. ‘Supremacy of legal authority. The law should rule officials, including judges, 
as well as ordinary citizens’. 
5. ‘Impartial justice. Courts should be available to enforce the law and should 
employ fair procedures’. 
 
Thus, the essence of the concept roughly includes guiding the citizen’s 
conduct and limiting the government, the latter element being of particular 
importance.28 It is vital not to confuse the Rule of Law with the ‘law and 
order’ advocated by the lawyers of authoritarian states, emphasising 
restraints on the citizens, not on government. Nevertheless, even having 
distinguished the authoritarian tendencies to misuse the concept, a 
                                               
25
 Rosenfeld, above n. 2 at 1307. 
26
 Numerous other lists of elements of the concept have been suggested. See for 
example A. Arnull, ‘The Rule of Law in the European Union’ in A. Arnull and D. 
Wincott (eds.) Accountability and Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press 2002) at 240; Popelier, above n. 2 at 98; J. Raz, ‘The Rule 
of Law and Its Virtue’ (1977) 93 Law Quarterly Review 195 at 198; L.  Fuller,  The 
Morality of Law (rev. ed.), (New Heaven/London: Yale University Press 1964) at 
38. 
27
 Fallon, above n. 2 at 8. 
28
 Limiting government is among the main aspects of constitutionalism. See also A. 
Sajó, Limiting Government: An Introduction to Constitutionalism (Budapest/New 
York: Central European University 1999). Some scholars build their definitions of 
the Rule of Law almost exclusively on the idea of limiting government. See for 
example Popelier above n. 2 at 82: Rechtstaat is ‘een dualistische visie op de 
verhouding tussen recht en staat, die een voortdurende poging inhoudt tot beperking 
van overheidswillekeur door de binding van de overhead aan het recht’. 
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substantial number of different lists of the elements of the Rule of Law is 
still available, providing largely diverging definitions of the concept. This 
theoretical abundance is not always helpful in clarifying the meaning of the 
Rule of Law and can even cause doubt as to its usefulness and workability. 
To penetrate the veil of myriad divergent definitions offered by scholarly 
literature, a fairly structured approach to the essence of the Rule of Law is 
required. 
 
2.3 Formal and substantive approaches to the Rule of Law 
 
Two main views of the Rule of Law can be distinguished: formal 
(procedural) and substantive.29 According to the former, the Rule of Law is 
vital for the effectiveness of the legal order and comes down to the rule by 
law, irrespective of the contents of the law.30 According to the latter, the 
Rule of Law can only exist if the legal system in question embraces a 
particular public morality, the laws being valued for their content: namely, a 
clear distinction is made between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ laws. Thus, the 
substantive vision of the Rule of Law goes far beyond the formal one. 
 It seems extremely difficult, if at all possible, to choose between the 
two, since the concepts are clearly very different, if not contradictory. 
Advocates of the formal Rule of Law submit that determining when law is 
‘good’ and when it is ‘bad’ would amount to complicated social philosophy 
and could result in the politicisation of the system:  
 
laws would be condemned or upheld as being in conformity with, or contrary to, the 
Rule of Law in this substantive sense when the condemnation or praise would 
simply be reflective of attachment to one particular political theory.31  
 
Raz emphasised that the Rule of Law is ‘just one of the virtues by which a 
legal system may be judged’,32 pointing to the fact that coupling the 
principle of the Rule of Law with the formal assessment of the quality of the 
laws might lead to confusion between the Rule of Law on the one hand and 
democracy, justice, and equality on the other – thus making the concept 
totally unusable. Indeed, ‘we have no need to be converted to the rule of law 
                                               
29
 For details, see for example P. Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the 
Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’ (1997) Public Law 467; Radin, above n. 2 
at 784; M.L. Fernandez Esteban, The Rule of Law in the European Constitution (The 
Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer 1999) at 91; also Biondo, above n. 12 at 11. 
30
 Raz, above n. 26; R.S. Summers, ‘A Formal Theory of the Rule of Law’ (1993) 6 
Ratio Juris 127. Dicey was also approaching the Rule of Law largely from the 
formal perspective. For the analysis of Dicey’s views in this light, see Craig, above 
n. 18 at 470; Kelsen, above n. 18 at 77. 
31
 Craig, above n. 29 at 468 (discussing the views of Raz). 
32
 Raz, above n. 26 at 196 (emphasis added). 
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just in order to discover that to believe in it is to believe that good should 
triumph.’33 However, it would be unwise always to turn a blind eye to the 
substance of the laws and to the goals they strive to achieve. In other words, 
while elaborate social-philosophical systems informing particular ‘thick’ 
concepts of the Rule of Law can ultimately undermine the principle, taking 
the contents of laws into account can be viewed as a natural requirement of 
any legal system striving to label itself as a Rule of Law regime. This can be 
especially acute in the context of development of the concept of Community 
Rule of Law, the Community largely being nothing but a consequence of the 
terrible cataclysms of the past century, which legal formalism failed to 
prevent. To agree with Biondo,  
 
non si può separare la definizione di Stato di diritto dall’analisi di quali principi di 
giustizia sono sottesi alle particolari declinazioni dell’ideale del “governo delle 
leggi”.34 
 
The formal conception of the Rule of Law boils down to two main 
ingredients: laws are passed correctly and legally by Parliament and they are 
‘capable of guiding one’s conduct in order that one can plan one’s life’.35 
The substantive conception adds to this a requirement that law should be 
used to foster liberty and ‘capture and enforce moral rights’.36 Making an 
analogy with the formal-substantive divide, if the Rule of Law is regarded 
merely as a procedural principle, it is possible to discuss the Rule of Law in 
a ‘narrow sense’,37 contrasting it with a ‘broader sense’ of the Rule of Law. 
The working of the Rule of Law in the ‘narrow sense’ can have repugnant 
and unjust consequences. To illustrate this claim, it is sufficient to turn to the 
USA during the time of slavery.38 To provide more recent examples, it has 
                                               
33
 Id. 
34
 See Biondo, above n. 29 at 31 (it is impossible to separate the definition of the 
Rule of Law (Stato di diritto) from the analysis of the principles of justice informing 
the particular filling of the ideal of the rule by law (governo delle leggi)). 
35
 See Craig, above n. 29 at 469. The latter element, writes Craig, includes a number 
of sub-elements: ‘that the laws should be prospective, not retrospective; that they 
should be relatively stable; that particular laws should be guided by open, general 
and clear rules; that there should be an independent judiciary; that there should be 
access to the courts; and that the discretion which law enforcement agencies possess 
should not be allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules.’ 
36
 R. Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Massachussets: Harvard 
University Press 1985) at 12; F.A. von Hayek, The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law 
(Cairo: National Bank of Egypt 1955); Fuller, above n. 26. (Radin claims that Fuller 
was an adherent of the formal Rule of Law theory: Radin, above n. 2, fn. 13). 
37
 See Rosenfeld, above n. 2 at 1313. 
38
 Consider Rosenfeld’s example of holding a federal law providing for the 
emancipation of a slave brought to federal territory unconstitutional as a deprivation 
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been pointed out that even the ‘principles used to organise Nazi Germany 
met in some formal sense the requirements of the Rule of Law’.39 
The two visions of the Rule of Law are so substantively different 
that a clarification is always needed whenever criticism is levelled at the 
authority based on the substantive Rule of Law argument. If this critique is 
employed, as underlined by Craig, ‘then intellectual honesty requires that 
this is made clear, and it also demands clarity as to the particular theory of 
justice which informs the critique.’40 
 
2.4 Diverging understandings of the concept by different legal traditions 
 
The Rule of Law controversy does not end at the formal-substantive divide. 
The differences between the content of the Rule of Law as understood in 
virtually any legal system in the world – obviously including all the EU 
Member States – add to the complexity of discovering what the Rule of Law 
could mean when transposed into the legal context of the European legal 
order with a view to making the best possible contribution to its functioning 
and development. The meaning of the concepts that correspond to the Rule 
of Law in the legal systems of EU Member States (and the candidate 
countries preparing to accede to the Union) differs to a considerable extent.41 
Since the legal systems of all modern democratic States only embrace certain 
elements of the concept and accord them different meanings, it is impossible 
to draw direct parallels between the national legal orders with respect to the 
precise meaning of the Rule of Law espoused by each system. As a 
consequence, even the correct translation of the term ‘Rule of Law’ into 
other languages is barely possible.42 
These differences are analysed in the academic literature in 
                                                                                                              
of the master of his property right without due process of law: U.S. Supreme Court, 
Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393, 459 (1857). 
39
 R.A. Epstein, ‘Beyond the Rule of Law: Civic Virtue and Constitutional 
Structure’ (1987) 56 George Washington Law Review 152; Biondo, above n. 12 at 
13. This observation would have been vigorously opposed by Hayek, who was 
suspicious of any ‘narrow technical meaning’ of the Rule of Law: Hayek, above n. 3 
at 91 and also 80 & fn. 1, where he dismisses a narrow view espoused by Dicey. For 
a discussion of a fascinating example of successful application of the principles of 
the Rule of Law and equality to strike down ethnic segregation of students in pre-
war Austrian universities by the Constitutional Court, going against main-stream 
anti-semitism see M.L. Marcus, ‘Austria’s Pre-War Brown v. Board of Education’ 
(2004) 32 Fordham Urban Law Journal 1. 
40
 See Craig, above n. 29 at 487. 
41
 F. Hoffmeister, ‘Changing Requirements for Membership’, in A. Ott and K. Inglis 
(eds.) Handbook on European Enlargement: A Commentary on the Enlargement 
Process (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2002) at 94. 
42
 See Marsh, above n. 2 at 229. 
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sufficient detail.43 A short example building on the essence of the État de 
droit and Rechtsstaat compared to the Rule of Law should suffice to provide 
an illustration. Thus, the Rechtsstaat can be viewed as ‘State rule through 
law’44 and État de droit as ‘a means to vindicate fundamental rights through 
law’.45 Clearly, both are essentially different from the Rule of Law discussed 
supra. This is not to say that other legal traditions know approaches to the 
Rule of Law simpler than the Anglo-American one; however, in all the 
European legal traditions the Rule of Law is a complex concept surrounded 
by academic debate. In discussing the Rule of Law, it is indispensable to 
bear in mind constantly the danger of oversimplification. Nevertheless, 
having a large number of different approaches to scope and meaning for the 
concept of the Rule of Law does not mean that any attempt to find the 
underlying core of these concepts discoverable in all its diverging 
manifestations are bound to be futile. On the contrary, it is believed that such 
generalisations are possible. Attempts to outline such a meta-concept of the 
Rule of Law have been made since the middle of the previous century, as 
lawyers have tried to produce a common vision of the Rule of Law on a 
world scale.46 Such attempts notwithstanding, Rule of Law is simply not a 
universal concept, as research demonstrates.47 
 
 
3 The nascent EU Rule of Law 
 
Notwithstanding the difficulties related to diverging views on the substance 
of the Rule of Law to be observed in different legal systems and in scholarly 
                                               
43
 For a brief account of the differences, see for example  Rosenfeld, above n. 2 at  
1318; Grote, above n. 14; Fernandez Esteban, above n. 29 at 66. (all with further 
references, analyzing each notion). See also Costa and Zollo, above n. 2 at 173, for 
specific analyses of the English, American, German and French concepts largely 
corresponding to the Rule of Law and also their historical development.  
44
 See Rosenfeld, above n. 2 at 1318; on Rechtsstaat see also Fernandez Esteban, 
above n. 28 at 81 et seq. 
45
 See Rosenfeld, above n. 2. at 1329; see also Fernandez Esteban, above n. 29 at 75 
et seq. (discussing the concept ‘Règne de la Loi’). 
46
 See Marsh, above n. 2, passim. While such attempts at the world scale were far 
from successful (largely due to the Soviet concept of Sotzialisticheskaja zakonnost’ 
[Socialist legality] which, though being similar to the Rule of Law, was still too 
different), in the Western democracies this exercise was a success. Now that the 
Soviet empire has collapsed, there is no longer a conflict regarding this issue On the 
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literature,48 European law has also embraced this principle. Clearly, the Rule 
of Law has been one of the milestone principles of the law of the European 
Communities from the moment of their creation.49  
 
3.1 Legal roots of the concept in Community and Union Law 
 
Although not part of the Treaties until the Treaty of Maastricht entered into 
force,50 the concept certainly played a significant role in Community law 
before that,51 stemming from the case-law of the ECJ, from the Court’s 
obligation to ‘ensure that in the interpretation of [the] Treaty the law is 
observed’,52 as well as from the national constitutional traditions of the 
Member States, as a source of legal principles recognised by the ECJ. 
With the introduction of a reference to the Rule of Law into the EU 
Treaty, the importance of the principle in EU law augmented drastically, 
codifying (in what is now Art. 6(1) EU) the long-recognised importance of 
this principle in the legal system of the Union and also reshaping the Rule of 
Law idea in general terms, making it one of the guiding written principles of 
European law. Article 7 EU also seems to be of importance in this regard, as 
serious and persistent breaches of the principle by the Member States can be 
sanctioned following the procedure described therein.53 Although it can be 
claimed that Article 7 EU communicates the vital importance of this 
principle for the Union, the Member States-oriented nature of this provision 
should not be underestimated. It is not about the Rule of Law of the 
Community, but the Rule of Law of its constituent parts.  
As well as Article 6(1) EU, the principle of the Rule of Law is also 
mentioned in the Preamble to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
European Union.54 The Lisbon Treaty, pending ratification, not only includes 
the Rule of Law in the list of values on which the Union is based but also 
                                               
48
 See n. 43 above. 
49
 Scholars started thinking about the Rule of Law as a principle of the Community 
legal order very early in the process of integration. See for example G. Bebr, Rule of 
Law within the European Communities (Bruxelles: Institut d’Etudes Européennes de 
l’Université Libre de Bruxelles 1965). 
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 The principle is mentioned in the Preamble to the EU Treaty (recital 3) and Arts. 6 
(1) EU; 11(1) EU, 177(2) EC. 
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 On the principle of the Rule of Law within the Community law context, see for 
example Arnull, above n. 26; Fernandez Esteban, above n. 29; Lord Mackenzie 
Stuart, The European Communities and the Rule of Law (London: Stevens and Sons 
1977); Bebr, above n. 49. 
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mentions this concept in the Preamble.55 
Before the Rule of Law was incorporated into the Treaties, its 
normative basis in EU law was not quite clear.56 Consequently, the ECJ had 
to assume the leading role in the promotion of this principle within the 
European legal order. The ECJ stated, for example, that ‘the EEC Treaty, 
albeit concluded in the forms of an international agreement, none the less 
constitutes the constitutional charter of a Community based on the Rule of 
Law.’57 
Given that the scope and the meaning of the Rule of Law varies 
depending on the legal system of the Member State concerned, it is clear that 
though it is mentioned in the Treaties and used by the ECJ, de facto the Rule 
of Law is not a purely EU law term, lying ‘at the crossroads of different 
constitutional traditions’ instead.58 This is also related to the fact that the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States guaranteeing the Rule of Law 
are among the sources of legal principles of the Community legal order. Inter 
alia, Article 6(1) EU is clear that the Rule of Law is one of the ‘principles 
which are common to the Member States’. How true is it, actually, given the 
huge discrepancies existing between the concepts corresponding to the 
Anglo-American ‘Rule of Law’ in the legal traditions of 26 other Member 
States? The precise legal concept referred to in Article 6(1) EU and 
translated into the 23 official languages of the European Union is extremely 
vague to say the least. What Article 6(1) EU makes clear is that, to use the 
words of Lord Mackenzie Stuart in reflecting on the longstanding practice 
that Article 6(1) EU codified,  
 
Communities rest on the concept that Member States are free and democratic 
societies which share the belief that relations between citizen and the state should 
rest upon the rule of law.59  
 
But what does this statement, together with the reference to the Rule of Law 
in Article 6(1) EU, do in order to clarify and explain the nature of the EU 
Rule of Law, resting on the necessary separation between the legal systems 
of the Union and the 27 Member States? It can only mean that the EU itself 
should be inspired by almost three dozen diverging theoretical-legal 
concepts loosely corresponding to what the Rule of Law is in the English 
system. 
                                               
55
 OJ (2008) C 115/1. 
56
 See Fernandez Esteban, above n. 29 at 102. 
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 Case 294/83 Partie Ecologiste ‘Les Verts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, § 23; 
Opinion 1/91 EEA Agreement [1991] ECR 6097. For an overview of the role played 
by the ECJ establishing the Rule of Law at Community level, see Fernandez 
Esteban, above n. 29 at 102. 
58
 Id. at  65. 
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3.2 Possibilities for confusion 
 
In practice, since the Treaty refers to different terms while making 
references to the Rule of Law, depending on the language and, consequently 
the national legal system(s) corresponding to each of the languages, the Rule 
of Law in EU law co-exists with État de droit, Rechtsstaat, and other 
national doctrines of the Member States, which, while being close in 
meaning, are nevertheless not identical. The substance of these national 
concepts obviously influences the interpretation of Community/Union legal 
instruments by the national courts of the Member States concerned. This 
somewhat paradoxical situation can result in confusion. Clearly, in order to 
achieve consistency in the interpretation of the Treaties in all Member 
States, the Rule of Law at the EU level cannot be understood in the same 
way as any of the corresponding national concepts (the Rule of Law, État de 
droit, Rechtsstaat etc.) are understood within the national legal orders of the 
Member States. This holds, notwithstanding the fact that the same word is 
used in each of the Community languages to refer to the Rule of Law as 
understood in the national legal tradition of a given Member State and to the 
EU understanding of the Rule of Law to be found in the Treaties and in the 
case-law of the ECJ. 
To make this difference clear, positive developments are required 
within the European legal order. More specifically, to agree with Arnull, an 
‘autonomous Union concept of the Rule of Law needs to be identified’.60 In 
practice it can be argued that this concept (theoretically at least) already 
exists. This is despite the fact that it is not well articulated and is mostly 
confined to the ideas of procedural legality and judicial review, as the case-
law of the ECJ demonstrates.61 Given the strong connection between the 
national legal orders of the Member States and the Community/Union legal 
order, the existence of such a concept results in a kind of double 
dédoublement of the Rule of Law, while at the EU level numerous national 
concepts compete with the EU concept. The latter exists at the national level 
side-by-side with the national conceptions of the Rule of Law, unlikely to 
result in any possibly unified approach to the concept in the EU context: the 
concept is thus context-dependent, its meaning being determined by the 
Member State where it is to be applied. This situation certainly does not add 
clarity to the meaning of the Rule of Law in any particular context. In view 
of this curious development, it has been predicted that ‘the paradox of the 
“two paradigms of law”, created by the co-existence of the two visions of the 
Rule of Law will become more and more evident.’62  
The EU Rule of Law is thus a deep and multilayered concept in the 
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process of articulation. 
 
3.3 EU Rule of Law in the present: limited and vague 
 
Unfortunately, the Treaties are silent on what the substance of the concept 
might be, ‘not indicat[ing] which meaning [of the Rule of Law] should 
prevail in the Community law context’.63 Clearly, the Union Rule of Law 
cannot be identical to any of the Rule of Law concepts that developed within 
the legal systems of the Member States. Simultaneously, it can potentially 
build on the ensemble of these concepts. 
The usual meaning of the Community Rule of Law as described in 
the scholarly literature is in most cases in close relation to legality. For 
instance, Lord Mackenzie Stuart characterised the Rule of Law as applied in 
Community Law as follows: ‘those who administer the Communities are 
themselves subject to limitations imposed by law and that those who are 
administered have rights in law which must be protected.’64 The role played 
by the ECJ in the establishment of the Community Rule of Law régime is 
particularly emphasised.65 Thus, to Alter, the Rule of Law in Europe is 
largely linked to the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect.66 She 
describes the emergence of the  
 
international rule of law in Europe where violations of the law are brought to court, 
legal decisions are respected, and the autonomous influence of law and legal rulings 
extends to the political process itself […] the governments are not above the law.67  
 
The ECJ was quite clear on this issue: 
 
the European Economic Community is a Community based on the rule of law, 
inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its Institutions can avoid a review of the 
question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic 
constitutional charter, the Treaty. In particular, in Articles 173 and 184, on the one 
hand, and in Article 177, on the other, the Treaty established a complete system of 
legal remedies and procedures designed to permit the Court of Justice to review the 
legality of measures adopted by the institutions.68 
 
The essence of the EU Rule of Law is quite a peculiar one, not only due to 
its layered nature and the poor articulation of its core meaning in the 
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Treaties. Another key aspect affecting the scope of this concept in the 
Community is in direct relation to the dual status of the Member States 
within the Community legal order. Each Member State is both subject to 
Community law and to a pouvoir constituant. As a consequence of this dual 
position, the Treaties, being the sources of primary law of the European legal 
order, are at the same time not solely the products of the Community legal 
order as such. Instead, they are negotiated and concluded by the Member 
States at the Intergovernmental Conferences with subsequent ratification in 
accordance with the Member States’ own constitutional requirements.69 This 
legislation–constitution divide inherent in the Community legal order affects 
the Union Rule of Law. For instance, partly as a consequence of this divide, 
the hierarchy of norms of Community law – an issue vital for establishment 
of the Rule of Law – although recognised by the ECJ,70 is far from being a 
settled issue, thus provoking academic debate.71 
The EU Rule of Law concept is also marked by a somewhat 
unfocused essence. While its importance is undisputed, nobody has been 
able to clearly summarise what it actually is and precisely how it is different 
from all its counterparts in the national law of the Member States. It is 
possible, however, to outline certain key features of the Community legal 
system that allow one to regard the Community as a Rule of Law entity. 
Such an exercise has recently been performed by Temple Lang, who focused 
on fourteen EC features that safeguard the Rule of Law in the Community:72 
 
1. Every measure must have an identifiable legal basis; 
2. Every measure must include a statement of reasons for its adoption;  
3. All EC measures must comply with all the relevant EC rules of both substantive 
and procedural law;  
4. If an EC measure infringes some fundamental or overriding rules, the 
Community may have to pay compensation;  
5. Community institutions may tie their own hands as to how they will exercise 
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their powers; 
6. EC powers must not be used for purposes other than those for which they were 
intended; 
7. The EP may bring a case in the ECJ to assert or defend its prerogatives; 
8. All EC measures must comply with fundamental rights principles; 
9. The European Commission has no power to create new obligations; 
10. No EC action may be taken which is not legally authorised; 
11. EC measures may sometimes be invalid if they are contrary to rules of public 
international law binding the Community; 
12. Community measures must be adopted in accordance with EC procedures and 
safeguards; 
13. Private parties can take the Commission to Court under Art. 232 EC if it fails to 
adopt an act addressed to them; 
14. There is a right of judicial review of all EC measures. 
 
An analysis of this list demonstrates that all the features are generally 
confined to the idea of legality: viewing the law through the prism of 
procedural rules and a possibility for judicial review. The same applies to the 
Union at large, through the introduction, for instance, of the Union duty of 
loyalty, similar to that of Article 10 EC.73 Is it enough for the formation of a 
genuine and functional concept of the Rule of Law to belong to the 
Community legal order? To answer in the positive would mean to embrace 
the thin concept of the Rule of Law. 
 
 
4 Towards the new EU Rule of Law? 
 
Thus far, the idea of the Rule of Law in European law has been characterised 
by an extremely high level of formalism and has suffered from a number of 
obvious contradictions inherent in its formulation. All this has come to 
undermine the potential of the Rule of Law principle in EU law. 
 The most important of the irregularities is directly related to the 
origin of the Rule of Law in the European legal order and is due to the 
connection that is made (both de jure and de facto) between the notion of the 
Rule of Law and the legal systems of the Member States. This is not to say 
that making connections between the Community/Union legal order and the 
legal orders of the Member States is problematic. However, in the case of the 
Rule of Law, such a connection, made inter alia through the mentioning of 
the Rule of Law in Article 6(1) EU, denies this notion its complexity. The 
Treaty does not recognise the deep diverging trends existing between the 
concepts of the Rule of Law in different Member States. Consequently, it is 
not quite clear what is left over for the EU to own as its own concept of EU 
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Rule of Law. Obviously, generalisations are always possible, resulting in 
long summaries of the overlapping elements of all the national theories, but 
how well will the Union’s own concept grow in such soil? To date, the 
purely formalist vision of the Rule of Law embraced by the Institutions at 
the Community level clearly has not resulted in the formulation of a truly 
workable and appealing self-standing concept. On the contrary, it seems that 
the notion of the Rule of Law has merely been used to describe the build-up 
of the system instead of enriching it and guiding its development. 
In practice, the link made between the EU Rule of Law and the 
notions corresponding to it in the legal theory of the Member States means 
that getting rid of the burden of the national way to interpret the notion in a 
situation where the EU notion should have come into play might be 
extremely difficult if not impossible. This leads to the unclear border lines 
between the EU Rule of Law (or the translation of this term into all the 
official Union languages) and the national concepts of the Rule of Law 
employed in the Member States. This observation has implications for the 
legalistic side of the problem as well: as long as no separation between the 
national and EU notions is made, the concept cannot be employed in an 
effective manner. 
 The second irregularity is related to a de facto emptiness of the 
notion at the Community/Union level. Since neither the Treaties nor the 
Court explained with clarity what the Rule of Law actually means at the 
Community level, the presumption of commonness in approaches taken by 
the legal systems of the Member States in filling the idea of the Rule of Law 
with substance almost hangs in a vacuum: only the minimal idea of legality 
and judicial review is to be found in the ECJ’s case-law. Most likely, this is 
indeed something shared by all the Member States, but as a consequence of 
such a minimalist perspective, the actual potential effects of the Rule of Law 
at the level of EU law have been unable to achieve expected proportions. 
 The Rule of Law certainly suffers from a limited use made of it by 
the European Court of Justice. Although it plays a significant role, its 
importance stops short of being a true guiding principle in 
Community/Union law, something that could be expected of it given the 
prominent role this concept plays in the national legal systems of the 
Member States. This is why only a simplistic idea regarding its essence 
exists today in the EU. If it were to guide the EU in a true legal sense, the 
Court would be bound to embrace the substantive notion of the Rule of Law 
and employ it alongside the formal one. Such a move would also make it 
impossible to avoid formulating a well-defined EU-law approach to the 
concept. 
 This is where the reasons for all the outlined shortcomings are 
rooted: they all relate to the limited vision of the Rule of Law adopted in EU 
law, focusing on a narrow formal approach. Scholars studying the 
functioning of the Rule of Law in the European legal context rarely go 
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beyond a pure description of how the Community/Union legal system 
functions. It is obvious that any true legal system will adhere to the basic 
minimalist Rule of Law idea, and the EU is not an exception. In other words, 
instead of guiding the development of the system and enriching the legal 
realities of the EU, the Rule of Law functions merely as a term referring to 
everything and to nothing. To say, for instance, that supremacy and direct 
effect as formulated by the ECJ became the cornerstones of the EU Rule of 
Law is not to say anything, because they simply constituted the 
Community/Union legal system as we know it. Thus, what is the practical 
use of the term ‘the Rule of Law’ in such a context? The Rule of Law is a 
genuinely important legal principle with a potential to explain the ongoing 
process of legal-political development of European integration as well as to 
improve people’s lives. To use it merely as a tag, not as a tool, seems to be a 
waste of its potential.74 
 This is all the more paradoxical given that in general the EU and 
especially the Community legal system is not formalistic at all. Marked by 
the pro-active use of the teleological method of interpretation by the ECJ and 
the increasing importance of the goals of integration, enabling even the 
reassessment of the Community competences in their light, there is a place 
for a more inclusive concept of the Rule of Law in the system. In a way, it 
has in fact always been there, only not called such. The objectives of 
integration outlined in Article 2 EC and Article 2 EU can be viewed as the 
‘moral good’ to provide the Rule of Law with substance. Consequently, this 
is beginning with the goals of integration that the idea of the EU Rule of 
Law needs to be analysed. Adhering to the substantive reading of the Rule of 
Law, the Court will acquire an additional tool in its arsenal of legal means to 
ensure that the law is observed. The potential impact of the employment by 
the Court of the principle of the Rule of Law as a substantive Rule of Law 
(as opposed to a purely formal concept) is likely to have far-reaching effects. 
It will not only allow shaping a true EU-law notion of the Rule of Law 
(based on the goals of the Treaties, it will not necessarily belong anymore to 
the legal-theoretical perceptions dominant in the Member States) but it will 
also better use the potential offered by the very idea of the Rule of Law. The 
Court will thus be enabled to employ the Rule of Law as a functional tool for 
the promotion of integration as opposed to a purely descriptive concept with 
limited added value for the shaping of the Communities and the Union. 
 In other words, in order to deal with the present shortcomings 
related to the functioning of the concept of the Rule of Law at the 
Community/Union level, two main developments can be of assistance: a 
clear formulation of the principle of the Rule of Law at the level of EU law, 
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and the employment at the Community level of a substantive concept of the 
Rule of Law, allowing the goals of integration to play the leading role in the 
construct. The substantive concept of the Rule of Law is thus to be 
reinvented at the EU level, the ‘filling’ of it coming from the very rationale 
behind the integration edifice. 
 
 
5 Concluding remarks 
 
This article looked at the way the concept of the Rule of Law is understood 
in legal theory and how it is applied in the legal context of European 
integration. Although the potential of the notion is clear, problems abound 
with regard to its application. They are related to the vagueness of the notion 
itself, to the number of different approaches existing in legal theory to the 
meaning of the Rule of Law, and also to the discrepancies between the scope 
and functioning of the Rule of Law and similar concepts in the legal orders 
of the Member States. The article argued that the Rule of Law as one of the 
principles of EU law stops short of its potential. As used in the doctrine to 
this day, it is purely descriptive of the European legal system and never 
transcends the limitations of a purely formalistic approach to the Rule of 
Law, mostly focusing on the idea of legality and procedural guarantees. In 
order to enrich its meaning, the concept of the Rule of Law to be used in 
European law should also acquire a substantive dimension, to add substance 
to its procedural aspects. This substance is nothing other than the objectives 
of integration. The formulation of a genuine EU-law concept of the Rule of 
Law independent of those of the Member States should naturally mean 
stepping away from formalism. 
